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Abstract—This paper argues that the problem of identity is a critical
challenge in agents which are able to reason about stories. The Xapagy
architecture has been built from scratch to perform narrative reasoning
and relies on a somewhat unusual approach to represent instances and
identity. We illustrate the approach by a representation of the story of
Little Red Riding Hood in the architecture, with a focus on the problem
of identity raised by the narrative.
I. INTRODUCTION
Note: To comply with the blind reviewing guidelines, the name of
the system in this paper has been changed to SWNN (system with
no name) and the name of the language employed by the system to
LWNN (language with no name).
We are swimming in a sea of stories, coming from printed,
audio and visual media as well as delivered by live speech. Even
more important is the narrative of our own lives, which includes
events which we witness, but also stories we plan, infer, imagine or
daydream.
Agents interacting with humans will need to become adept on
manipulating stories. This includes creating stories from their life
experience, recalling or re-narrating stories with various levels of
accuracy, predicting future events in stories, expressing surprise and
so on. Some of this qualifies as story understanding, but we feel the
term must be applied with care. Even for our own life narrative,
there are many stories which we do not understand in all their
deep implications, and many narratives we encounter are illogical,
incoherent or lack deeper meaning. Human interactions proceed quite
well without perfect understanding. Some level of narrative reasoning
ability, however, is necessary.
The Xapagy cognitive architecture has been designed with the
explicit goal to model and mimic the activities performed by humans
when witnessing, reading, recalling, narrating and talking about
stories. In contrast to other systems which treat the textual form of
a narrative as a standalone, first class object, Xapagy is an agent
oriented system: a narrative is always seen through the experience of
an individual agent, and the mode in which the narrative is delivered
to the agent (for instance, the pace of story-telling or rhetorical
breaks) changes the way in which the agent “understands” the story.
Xapagy has been developed from scratch, which required us to
revisit many of the problems identified in the classic literature of the
story understanding. Some of the representational decisions of the
system, however, led to a number of priority reversals. In particular,
the problem of identity became a determining factor of the overall
architecture of the system. On the other hand, challenges such as
anaphora resolution or the logical and/or psychological justification
of actions had been relegated to those which we expect to be handled
by the emergent properties of the system.
This paper illustrates the problem of identity and the architectural
solution for it offered by the Xapagy architecture. We shall use as
a running example a relatively complex narrative, the story of Little
Red Riding Hood (LRRH) and the Big Bad Wolf. This story is one
of the archetypal fairy tales of the western culture. Almost everyone
is exposed to it in early childhood. In many countries, it is the first
middle length story a child is told. In contrast to the feel-good nature
of modern fairy tales, the story is very dark, involving the gruesome
(and in some versions, final) death of the three central characters.
The story also has well known sexual connotations - in its original
form being probably a cautionary tale for young girls against sexual
predators. Overall, it exhibits a strong “canonical strangeness” in the
definition used by Harold Bloom [?].
LRRH poses a formidable series of problems from the point of
view of computational narrative analysis. For systems which try to
reason about stories based on the rational or psychologically justified
actions of their participants, LRRH is a challenge, as the participants
act in an irrational and psychologically unjustifiable way. There are
internal logical gaps: we need to accept the fact that the wolf is able to
eat Grandma and LRRH because LRRH talked to the wolf. There are
physical impossibilities (the wolf swallowing Grandma and LRRH
whole), as well as biological ones (they emerge unharmed from the
wolf’s belly).
Do children really understand LRRH? Parents often try to present
the text as some kind of child-disobeying-parent educational message,
without referring to the sexual connotations of the story. There is an
example of Marxist literary criticism which presented the story as an
allegory of class warfare.
While creating a representation of the story which can be under-
stood by a Xapagy agent, we have found that many (although not
all) the difficulties are related to identities1. For example: how does
the LRRH in the mother’s instructions relate to the real LRRH? Who
1We believe that using LRRH to illustrate the problems of identity makes
the case better than stories in which the problem of identity is more blatant
– such as Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
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2does LRRH really talking to when asking Grandma about the size of
her eyes? After we have imagined the gory death of Grandma and
LRRH, are the persons emerging from the wolf’s belly identical to
the ones which have been swallowed?
The remainder of this paper attempts to answer some of these
questions by outlining key points of the representation of the LRRH
story for the Xapagy agent. Section II presents an informal intro-
duction of the Xapagy system and the Xapi pidgin language. In
Section III we consider selected snippets from the fairy-tale, discuss
the representational difficulties they represent and show how they
can be converted to the Xapi language. Related work is discussed in
Section IV and we conclude in Section V.
II. AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO XAPAGY
A. External look: the pidgin language
The Xapagy architecture describes the operation of an autonomous
agent which can directly witness events happening in the world, and
it can communicate with humans and other agents through the Xapi
pidgin language. Pidgin languages [8] are natural languages with
a simplified syntactic structure which appear when two groups of
people need to communicate without the time necessary to properly
learn each other’s languages. Xapi shares some important features
with human pidgin languages. It has an uncomplicated causal struc-
ture, it uses separate words to indicate degrees of properties, it has
a fixed word order and does not support quantifiers. A line of Xapi
text represents a single sentence, with the sentence parts separated
by “/” and terminated with a period “.” or question mark “?”.
1 The girl / hits / the wolf.
2 Wh / eats / "LRRH"?
The Xapi parser translates a Xapi statement into a single verb in-
stance (VI) while compound statements into a several interconnected
VIs. Xapi supports a single form of compound sentence, the quotation
sentence:
1 "LRRH" /says in "conversation" //
2 eyes --of-- you / is-a / big.
In some cases, the semantics of other compound or complex
sentences can be approximated by sentences which refer to shared
instances or VIs. We make, however, no claim that the expressive
power of Xapi matches that of a natural language.
Subjects and objects are instances which are either currently in the
focus, or are newly created by the sentence. A new instance can be
created by prefixing a word with the indefinite article “a/an”:
1 "LRRH" / has / a hood.
In this example we assume LRRH has been referred to before, but
the hood has been just introduced in the story. Subsequent references
to the already introduced instance of the hood are prefixed with the
definite article “the” (which can be omitted for proper nouns).
In pidgin, we refer to instances through one or more of their
attributes. When we mention the attribute [basket], the reference
will be made to the strongest instance in the scene which has the
given attribute. In some cases, such as quotations, the resolution
process is performed in the scene specified by the in scene part
of the sentence, which might or might not be the same as the scene
of the inquit.
The verb word in a Xapi sentence actually maps to a mixture
(overlay) of verb concepts in the internal representation of the Xapagy
agent. The composition of this verb overlay determines the relation-
ship between the sentences. For actions such as “hits” or “bites”,
the relationship between the sentences is one of a weak temporal
succession. There are some sentences which do not represent actions
in time, and thus they are not connected by succession relationships.
Examples are verbs which set attributes to instances or establish
relationships between instances:
1 "LRRH" / is-a / small girl.
2 "Grandma" / loves / the girl.
B. From words to concepts and verbs
We have seen that the Xapi pidgin uses a simplified syntax, but
otherwise regular English words. The dictionary of the agent maps
nouns and adjectives to overlays of concepts while verbs and adverbs
are mapped to overlays of verb concepts. We will discuss concept
overlays, as the verb overlays are very similar.
An overlay is the simultaneous activation of several concepts with
specific levels of energy. For instance the dictionary of a Xapagy
agent might associate the word “girl” with the following overlay:
[human=1.0, female=1.0, young=0.5 small=0.5]
The attributes of an instance are represented by an overlay which
can be gradually extended through the side effects of the sentences.
Thus, when reading "LRRH" / is-a / girl the instance identified
with the attribute LRRH will acquire the attributes described in the
overlay: human, female, young and so on.
Concepts are internal structures of the Xapagy agent. To distin-
guish them from words, which are external entities, we will always
show them in brackets, such as [female].
Concepts can overlap on a pair-by-pair basis. For instance,
there is a full overlap between man and human, meaning all
men are human: overlap ([man],[human]) = area ([man]). Thus, if
we inquire whether LRRH is human, we shall obtain a value of
1.0. There is, on the other hand, only a partial overlap between
courageous and fearless: overlap ([fearless], [courageous]) =
0.5·area ([courageous]).
Words denoting proper nouns, such as "LRRH", marked in pidgin
by quotation marks, are treated slightly differently: when the agent
first encounters a proper noun, it will create a new concept with a
very small area, and an entry in the domain dictionary associating the
proper noun with an overlay containing exclusively the new concept.
Other than this, proper nouns are just like any other attributes. Having
the same proper noun as an attribute does not immediately imply any
form of identity.
The dictionary which maps from a word to an overlay, the areas
and overlap of the concepts are part of the domain knowledge of the
agent. Different agents might have different domain knowledge - thus
the meaning of the word might differ between agents.
C. Instances
The definition of an instance in Xapagy is somewhat different from
the way this term is used in other intelligent systems. Instead of
representing an entity of the real world, it represents an entity of the
story, over a time span limited by the additivity of the attributes. For a
particular instance, its attributes, represented in a form of an overlay
of concepts, are additive: once an instance acquired an attribute, the
attribute remains attached to the instance forever.
The advantage of this definition is that once we have identified an
instance, there is no need for further qualification in order to identify
its attributes (nor its actions).
What might be counter-intuitive for the reader, however, is that
things we colloquially call a single entity are represented in Xapagy
by several instances. Let us, for instance, consider LRRH. There are
several versions of the story, ranging from Charles Perrault’s (with
no happy ending) and the widely known Brothers Grim version, to
the countless adaptations and parodies in modern media, including
the 2011 movie starring Amanda Seyfried.
3In Xapagy , these are all different instances, which share the
attribute ["LRRH"]. These instances, can be connected through
various relations of identity (somatic, psychological, analogical and
so on). The Xapagy system, however, moves a step beyond this.
Not only LRRH from the Brothers Grim story and LRRH from the
Hollywood movie are represented by different instances, but LRRH
the live girl and LRRH the food item in the wolf’s belly are also
two different instances, as the change can not be represented as an
addition of attributes.
Whenever, at a later time, the Xapagy agent recalls LRRH (for
instance, in a conversation) it first needs to establish which instance
is under consideration. Once this instance has been unequivocally
established to be, for instance, the live LRRH at the beginning of
the story, all the attributes of the instance are also unambiguously
established: we can say that she is young, happy, naive etc., attributes
which would not make sense applied to the LRRH-as-food instance.
D. The focus
The focus in the Xapagy system holds instances and VIs after their
creation for a limited time interval during which they are changeable.
After an instance or VI leaves the focus, it can never return - and
thus, it remains unchanged.
Instances in the focus can acquire new attributes, participate as a
subject or object in VIs and become part of relations. VIs in the focus
can become part of succession or summarization relations, and they
can be referred to by new VIs.
A visual thinking oriented reader might think about the focus in
the following way: the focus is a dynamically evolving graph. New
nodes (instances and VIs) are added through various events. The same
events might also create new edges among the nodes of the focus.
When a node leaves the focus, it retains its attributes and edges, but
it can not acquire new ones any more. So the focus can be seen
as the actively growing boundary of a graph which represents the
complete experience of the Xapagy agent. The graph will be only
locally connected: it will not have long links, as only nodes which
have been in the focus together can have links.
The instances and VIs participate in the focus with a dynamically
evolving weight. In absence of any events, the weights are gradually
decreasing. Instances are refreshed when they participate in new VIs
(events). Action events are “pushed out” from the instance by their
successors. In addition to these, the weights are affected by a number
of other dynamic factors.
E. Shadows and headless shadows
Instances and VIs leaving the focus will be demoted to the memory
of the Xapagy agent with a certain level of salience. They will never
enter the focus again. On the other hand, each instance and VI in
the focus has a shadow, a weighted collection of instances and,
respectively, VIs from the memory.
The shadows are maintained through a combination of techniques
whose goal is to make the shadows consistent between each other
and match the ongoing story with the collections of stories in the
shadows.
Shadows are always matched to instances and VIs in the focus. The
VIs in shadows, however, bring with themselves VIs to which they are
connected through succession, context and summarization relations.
These VIs can be clustered into weighted sets which are very similar
to shadows, but they are not connected to current focus components.
These sets are called headless shadows and they represent outlines
of events which the agent either expect to happen in the future or
assume that they had already happened but have not been witnessed
(or they are missing from the narration). If an event matching the
headless shadow happens, the two are combined to become a regular
focus-component / shadow pair.
Shadowing is the fundamental reasoning mechanism of the Xapagy
architecture. All the higher level narrative reasoning methods rely on
the maintenance of the shadows. For instance, the Xapagy agent can
predict that the wolf will eat LRRH using a headless shadow, and can
express surprise if this does not happen. While in this example the
shadow is created after the events are inserted into the focus from
an external source (for instance, by reading), the opposite is also
possible. In the case of recall, narration, or confabulation, the agent
creates instances and VIs in the focus based on pre-existing headless
shadows.
F. Diffusion activities, spike activities and elements of prosody
The state of a Xapagy agent is modified by two kind of activities:
spike activities (SA) and diffusion activities (DA).
SAs are instantaneous operations on overlays and weighted sets.
Examples of activities modeled by SAs include inserting an instance
in the focus, inserting a VI in the focus, and enacting the side effects
of a VI. SAs are not parallel: the Xapagy agent executes a single SA
at a time.
DAs represent gradual changes in the overlays and weighted sets;
the amount of change depends on the amount of time the diffusion
was running. Multiple DAs run in parallel, reciprocally influencing
each other. As a practical matter the Xapagy system implements
DAs through discrete steps, with a temporal resolution an order of
magnitude finer than the arrival rate of VIs.
G. Identity relations
In Xapagy the same instance represents an entity only as long as
its attributes are additive (that is, the addition of new attributes can be
perceived as discovery). Many situations which in colloquial terms
appear to be occurrences of the same entity, in Xapagy are represented
with two or more instances connected by identity relations. Three
types of identity relations are currently implemented:
somatic-identity: connects instances which share the same
physical body at different points in time. Two instances connected
with somatic identity can not be simultaneously in focus. The somatic
identity relation is created automatically as a side effect of the
changes verb, which also removes the old instance from the focus.
Somatic identity also connects the instances corresponding of the
same character as seen over the course of time in multiple distinct
episodes. By extension, somatic identity is also used to re-connect
characters when a longer story is revisited (e.g. when reading a book
over the course of several days).
fictional-identity: used for the relationship between an in-
stance, and alter-ego’s of this instance in fictional pasts or futures. Ex-
amples involve planning, daydreaming, or lying. Instances connected
with fictional identity can be simultaneously present in the focus, in
which case they will automatically be in each other’s shadows.
view-identity: used for instances which are viewed differently in
different scenes. They represent different interpretations of the scene,
such as in cases of role playing. View identity is inherited when one
of the instances is replaced by a somatically identical new instance
as an effect of the changes verb.
III. CASE STUDIES OF IDENTITY PROBLEMS IN LRRH
As an exercise in story representation, we have translated the
Brothers Grim version of the story into the Xapi language. Exper-
imentally, we also created several alternative, postmodern versions.
4Naturally, this required the creation of an adequate vocabulary, as well
as concept and verb concept databases. As the reasoning process of
the Xapagy agent relies on previous experience, in order to obtain a
level of understanding comparable to, let us say, a four year old girl,
we would need to provide it with the background of stories posessed
by the four year old girl. The development of such a background
story database is a major knowledge engineering problem, and our
ongoing work will be reported elsewhere.
During the translation process, we have found that LRRH has
been represented by 6-7 different instances, making the definition and
handling of identity one of the critical problems of representation and
understanding.
In the following we shall select snippets of the story in natural
language and illustrate how the problems of identity were handled
during the translation into the Xapi format.
A. The existence and identity of the narrative voice
A little girl, Cindy, goes to bed and asks her Daddy to read
her a story.
“I am going to read you a story, written by the Brothers
Grim. Once upon a time, there was a little girl, who had a
red riding hood.”
“I have a red hood myself”, says Cindy.
“They called her Little Red Riding Hood”.
As short as it is, this little snippet introduces three narrative planes.
The first is the bedroom, where Cindy is listening to a story narrated
by her dad. The second is the one in which the Brothers Grim are
writing the story (presumably, by sitting at their desk, somewhere in
Germany in the XVIII-th century - this is however, not explicit in
the story). The third narrative plane involves the fairytale inhabited
by LRRH.
The Xapagy system handles narrative planes by the system of
scenes. A scene is a collection of instances in the focus. VIs usually
refer to instances in the current scene. Quote type VIs refer to the
current scene in the inquit and a specified scene in the quote. Scenes
are not necessarily physical environments. We, however, hypothesize
that in the evolution of human cognition, narrative planes have
originated from the representation of physical scenes, thus they will
tend to have relations between instances isomorphic to the physical
world. This is largely the same assumption as the one advocated by
George Lakoff [5]. The Xapagy system does not currently provide
a feature to automatically infer scenes. To simplify the problem of
scene reference, in this paper we will assign a proper noun to every
scene.
With these preliminaries, the beginning of the snipped is translated
to Xapi as follows.
1 A scene "bedroom" / is-current-scene.
2 A girl "Cindy" / exists.
3 "Cindy" / is-inside / a bed.
4 A big man / exists.
5 The man / is-parent-of / "Cindy".
6 A scene "writing"/ exists.
7 A scene "fairytale"/ exists.
8 Man --parent-of-- "Cindy"/ says in "writing"//
9 "BrothersGrim"/ exists.
10 Man --parent-of-- "Cindy"/ says in "writing"//
11 "BrothersGrim"/ writes in "fairytale"//
12 A little girl/ exists.
The three-level indirection in the last sentence might come as a
surprise. Yet, from the perspective of the reader of this paper, one
would have even more levels of indirection:
1 I / read in "AAMAS-proceedings" //
2 author / writes in "bedroom" //
3 man --parent-of-- "Cindy"/ says in "writing"//
4 "BrothersGrim"/ write in "fairytale"//
5 a little girl/ exists.
Will the entire story be narrated with this level of indirection?
We could, of course, use a macro to simplify the Xapi input. We
believe, however, that human listeners remove the levels of indirect
narration from a longer story they follow, and eventually reach a
point where they follow the story either through a single indirection or
through none, as if directly witnessed (possibly this latter corresponds
to the phenomena commonly known as suspension of disbelief). This
simplification of narrative planes is represented in the Xapi text.
The first to disappear is the Brothers Grim scene, and Father
becomes the direct narrator of the fairytale2.
1 Man/ says in "fairytale" //
2 The girl/ has / a red hood.
3 "Cindy"/ says in "bedroom" //
4 I/ have/ a red hood.
5 Man / says in "fairytale" //
6 She / is-a / "LRRH".
A typical human reader will infer from the text that Cindy identifies
herself with the girl in the story. Analogously, a Xapagy agent will
automatically place Cindy in the shadow of the LRRH instance (and
vice versa) due to the perceived similarities. This shadowing allows us
to infer things in the future - for instance the fact that the emotional
states of Cindy might mirror those of LRRH. Shadows, however,
do not become part of the remembered stories. It is likely (but not
guaranteed) that the shadows will be recreated in a roughly similar
way when recalling the story. If this subconscious identification
is made explicit, it can be represented through a fictional identity
relation.
1 "Cindy" / thinks in "bedroom" //
2 I / is-fictionally-identical /
3 "LRRH" --of-- "fairytale".
We can insert this statement explicitly in the narration, or a Xapagy
agent’s missing relation reasoning might infer it automatically (based
on the strong presence of the shadows). Such a relation will become
part of the episodic memory and guide future recalls.
B. Orders from Mom: identity in a hypothetical future
Little Red Riding Hood’s mother told her: “You will take a
basket and fill it with bread, cheese, and a bottle of wine.
You will take it to Grandma’s house in the forest. ”
The orders from mother are obviously a new narrative, which takes
place in a different scene. We are concerned about (1) the relationship
between the two scenes and (2) the relationship between LRRH who
is present in both scenes.
1 Woman --parent-of-- "LRRH"/
2 implies in "fairytale"//
3 a scene "orders"/ exists.
4 She/ implies in "fairytale" //
5 the "orders"/ is-future-hypothetical /
6 the "fairytale".
7 She/ implies in "orders"//
8 a little girl/ exists.
9 She/ implies in "orders"//
10 the girl/ is-fictionally-identical /
11 the girl in "fairytale".
It should not be surprising by now that the Xapagy system
represents this with distinct scenes and distinct instances, which are
2Having multiple layers of indirections is a well known literary device,
from the Arabian Nights to Chaucer and Boccaccio. Some modern novels,
such as Umberto Eco’s “The Name of the Rose”, use a staggering number of
narrative planes to frame the story. However, a reader continuing the reading
the next day will obviously not recreate (or even remember) the number of
indirections. One narrative plan (the old monk writing in the monastery of
Melk) will return at the end, but not the other ones.
5connected with specific relations (future-hypothetical for the
scenes and fictional-identity for LRRH).
Having an identity relation only affects the way in which shad-
owing happens: instances connected with identity relations do not
necessarily share attributes - a little girl can imagine an alternative
reality in which she would be a princess, or a steam engine. Identity
type relations, however, reinforce shadow matching, which allows
the prediction mechanism to predict future actions (which might be
possibly enacted) and the surprise mechanism to express surprise if
the real continuation diverges from the predicted one.
C. Telling to the wolf / Lying to the wolf
In the story, LRRH meets the wolf and tells him about her plans.
For illustrative purposes, we will discuss a variant of the story, where
LRRH is actually lying about her plans.
“Where are you going, little girl?”, asked the wolf. “I
am going to a picnic with my boyfriend, the hunter. I
am carrying a basket of food and wine, and a concealed
weapon.”.
1 Scene / implies in "conversation" //
2 a girl / exists.
3 "LRRH"/ is-fictionally-identical/
4 the girl -- in -- "conversation".
5 Scene / implies in "conversation" //
6 a wolf / exists.
7 The wolf / is-fictionally-identical/
8 the wolf -- in -- "conversation".
9 Wolf / says in "conversation" //
10 girl / goes-to / wh?
11 "LRRH"/ says in "conversation"//
12 I/ has /a basket.
13 "LRRH" / says in "conversation" //
14 I/ has /a weapon.
15 "LRRH" / says in "conversation" //
16 a man hunter / exists.
17 "LRRH" / says in "conversation" //
18 the hunter / is-boyfriend-of / I.
Let us see what exactly is going on here, and whether the arrange-
ment will yield a behavior which mimics the human behavior about
stories. At a surface level, we have a new scene, the conversation
scene "conversation", in which we have a new instance of a girl,
fictional-identity connected to LRRH. The instances of the hunter
boyfriend and the weapon are present only in this scene.
The Xapagy agent listening to this is a customer of the complete
narrative, which started with Cindy and her dad in the bedroom.
The agent can simply record this narration, setting up the relations
as it goes. If at this moment the listener agent has a moment of
respiro, it can enter into a confabulation mood, and it can generate
a continuation of the story, for instance, from the perspective of the
wolf:
1 Wolf / thinks in "wolf-plan" //
2 I / attacks / the girl.
3 Wolf / thinks in "wolf-plan" //
4 The girl / shoots / I.
5 Wolf / thinks in "wolf-plan" //
6 I/ changes /dead.
Xapagy being strongly reliant on episodic memory, such a recall
can only happen if the agent has previous experience of stories
involving shooting and killing.
D. Swallowing grandma
The wolf knocked on the door. Grandma opened the door
and the wolf gobbled her up!
The surface meaning of the snippet can be trivially translated into
Xapi :
1 The wolf / knocks / the door.
2 "Grandma" / opens / the door.
3 The wolf/ gobbles-up / "Grandma".
What the Xapagy agent will understand of it, depends very much
on the previous experience of the agent (we are assuming the
vocabulary and life experience of a 4 year old) and how much time
the agent has to infer missing actions.
Case 1: If the agent has never encountered the word “gobbles-up”
before, it will create a dictionary entry, and a new verb concept - but
nor further inference will be made. The representation of the agent
will not have grandma disappear from the scene.
Case 2: The agent knows the word “gobbles-up” and equivalates
it with “eats”. The side effect of this verb will remove the object
from the current scene, but other inferences depend on the stories
in the episodic memory of the agent. If the agent has no experience
in swallowing live food (nor in stories involving the concrete act of
dying), it will not make the inference that Grandma is dead. If such
experience exists, the inferred statements will be:
1 "Grandma" / changes / not-alive.
2 "Grandma" / changes / chewed-food.
3 The chewed-food / leaves-scene.
4 The wolf / is-a / not-hungry.
These statements actually represent two instance replacements for
the initial Grandma instance, which will be connected with the
relation somatic-identity.
These inferences will only be made if the agent can internally insert
four VI’s into the focus. This requires a respiro - either the pace of
narration must be sufficiently slow, or the narrator might make a
longer pause to allow the agent to fill in the gaps in the narrative.
If the agent is reading, rather than listening to an ongoing narrative
it can create its own respiro. If the pace of a narrative is very fast,
the agent will still create headless shadows (which are maintained by
DAs) but will never get to instantiate them (which requires triggering
an SA).
Case 3: If the agent which is listening to a narrative had heard or
read the story of LRRH before, the strongest shadows will map to
the previous instances of the story (even if there are some differences
between the versions). In this case the strongest headless shadows
will predict the continuation of the story along the lines of previous
versions. The inferences made by the agent will most likely not be
from its life experience, but from the previous versions of the story3.
E. Impersonating grandma
For mysterious reasons, the wolf chooses to impersonate grandma
to the arriving LRRH. The scene evolves through the famous con-
versation:
“Why are your eyes so big?” asked the girl.
“To see you better,” said the wolf.
“But why are your ears so big?” asked the girl.
“To hear you better,” answered the wolf.
“But why is your mouth so big?” asked Little Red Riding
Hood.
“To swallow you better!” said the wolf, and jumped up and
swallowed Little Red Riding Hood whole.
3It is a well known aspect of the children’s story telling the child which
jumps in with the inferred continuation of the story - such as in the famous
beginning of Pinocchio:
Centuries ago there lived—
“A king!” my little readers will say immediately.
No, children, you are mistaken. Once upon a time there was a piece of
wood.
6This scene makes very little sense from any narrative coherence
point of view. It is hard to believe that LRRH mistakes the wolf for
Grandma, but it is even harder to believe that the wolf chooses to act
as if it would be Grandma.
The Xapagy approach to represent this, when seen from the
third person omniscient narration perspective (which is also the
one of the Brothers Grim, the narrating father’s and Cindy’s) is to
represent two separate scenes. One of them is the physical scene,
inhabited by LRRH and the wolf, while the other one is the scene
of the conversation, inhabited by an alternate version of LRRH and
Grandma. The instances are linked together using view-identity
relations.
1 A scene "GrandmasHouse" / is-only-scene.
2 A wolf / exists.
3 A little girl "LRRH" / exists.
4 A scene "conversation" / exists.
5 Scene "conversation" / is-current-scene.
6 An old woman "Grandma" / exists.
7 "Grandma" / is-view-identical
8 / the wolf -- in -- "GrandmasHouse".
9 A little girl / exists.
10 The girl / is-view-identical
11 / "LRRH" -- in -- "GrandmasHouse".
12 The girl / has-as-grandparent / "Grandma".
13 Scene "GrandmasHouse" / is-current-scene.
14 The girl / asks in "conversation"//
15 eyes -- of -- "Grandma"/ wh is-a / big?
16 The wolf / says in "conversation"//
17 eyes -- of -- "Grandma"/ sees good / the girl.
18 The girl / asks in "conversation"//
19 mouth -- of -- "Grandma"/ wh is-a / big?
20 The wolf / says in "conversation"//
21 "Grandma" / swallows good / the girl.
22 The wolf / swallows / "LRRH".
One of the interesting consequences of this representation is that
both scenes will create headless shadows which will predict different
continuations. The conversation scene will predict actions appropriate
to the Grandma-granddaughter relation, while the physical scene will
predict actions relevant to the wolf-little girl relation. The Brothers
Grim create suspense by choosing repeatedly from the continuations
predicted by the conversation scene. At the moment when the wolf
swallows LRRH, both the physical scene and the conversation scene
created headless shadows which predicted the action.
F. LRRH and grandma emerge from the wolf
The hunter shot the wolf, and then cut his belly. Suddenly,
Little Red Riding Hood emerged from the belly, followed
by Grandma!
The wolf will go through an identity change from a live animal to
a dead one. New instances for LRRH and Grandma will be created as
they appear from the wolf-s belly. The critical part of this snippet is
that the narrator needs to establish a somatic identity relation between
the newly created instances and the initial instances corresponding to
those objects.
1 The hunter / shots / the wolf.
2 The wolf / changes / dead.
3 The hunter / cuts / the belly --of-- wolf.
4 An "LRRH" / exits / the belly.
5 "LRRH" / is-somatically-identical /
6 "LRRH" --in-- "Grandmashouse".
7 An "Grandma" / exits / the belly.
8 "Grandma" / is-somatically-identical /
9 "Grandma" --in-- "Grandmashouse".
IV. RELATED WORK
The Xapagy system, as a body of software implementation is
positioned as a cognitive architecture, a software system which tries
to model a large subset of human cognition[7]. The specific objective
of the Xapagy architecture is to achieve narrative reasoning, i.e. to
mimic the activities performed by humans when witnessing, reading,
recalling, narrating and talking about stories. There is an immense
body of literature relevant to this enterprise. We shall only mention
some of them which had been influential in our position with regards
to the problem of identity in Xapagy .
The problem of personal identity in philosophy. The “Personal
Identity” entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [?] mentions
a number of topics on which philosophers had focused ranging from
the self-definition of a person to the minimal conditions necessary to
accept somebody as a person. What is relevant to the work at hand
however, are the answers given to the problem of persistence: is a
particular person identical to a person in a particular moment of the
past?
The Psychological Approach assumes that a psychological relation
between the two entities is necessary and/or sufficient to consider
the two persons identical. A simplistic version of this approach is
the Memory Criterion, a person is identical with a person in the
past if it can remember the person’s past experiences. Although the
Memory Criterion is sometimes attributed to Locke[?], he was aware
of its drawbacks and in fact anticipated many of the later objections.
The greatest problem with the Memory Criterion is that memory is
not perfect: an adult can remember events from childhood, and an
elderly person might remember events from adulthood, but not from
childhood (the gallant officer’s paradox).
Grice [?] proposed a solution based on the idea of “total temporal
state”, which is essentially all the events a person remembers or can
potentially remember at some moment in time. Overlap between the
total temporal can prove the identity of two persons. A different
approach proposed by Shoemaker[?] is based on causal dependence:
two persons are considered identical if they are connected by a
continuous causal chain of psychological connections. To overcome
the problem of imperfect memory both approaches are relying in fact
on the transitive closure of a sparse graph, where the edges represent
either remembrances or more general psychological connections.
The Somatic Approach ties the identity of the person to the physical
object, the human animal which embodies it. The continuity of the
persons are based on brute physical continuity.
A third view, sometimes called the Simple View denies that these
or other identifiers of identity are necessary and sufficient. In this
view, psychological or physical continuity are just probabilistic signs
of the personal identity. The identity is a self-containing definition,
it can not be decomposed or proved with a set of simpler concepts.
In fact, the proponents of this view point out that there is no need
for continuity of the person for the survival of the human animal.
One of the important issues related to the persistency problem is
the problem of fission. In human terms, this is usually stated with
a thought experiment of the brain of a person being replicated and
embedded in the other person. This lead to a famous debate between
Parfit and Lewis [?].
The problem of identity in cognitive systems, with a special
attention to the problem of narratives and philosophical implications
had been treated in a series of papers by Nissan[?].
Classical story understanding systems: Story understanding as a
separate body of work inside artificial intelligence has a rich tradition,
starting from work by Charniak[?], [?], Schank and Abelson[?],
Norvig[?], Ram[?], Narayanan[6], Mueller[?].
The term “classic” frequently refers to the fact that these ap-
proaches, although frequently relying on methods of learning, are not
statistical in nature, and perform what, in recent the recent dispute of
Norvig vs. Chomsky [?] has become known as focusing on the deep
whys.
7It is fair to say that classical story understanding models have
been shadowed in the last decade by the statistics based NLP - even
prompting some arguments that the statistical models represent the
final solution for text understanding - a position we do not share.
Xapagy is clearly a system which fits in this body of work: it
is performing operations over narratives (stories), it attacks some of
the same issues (such as the expression of surprise, unfolding the
structure of the story etc), and it does not use statistical learning. On
the other hand, Xapagy does not start from human language but from
the relatively controlled Xapi pidgin.
Semantic NLP: an extensive and varied class of recent systems are
considering the semantics of natural language processing.
The way in which the semantics is defined in these systems covers a
large range. The explicit semantic analysis (ESA) approach proposed
by Gabrilovich and Markovich [4]. This work defines the semantics
of a text by its position in a multi-dimensional semantic space, where
each dimension is defined by a basic concept. The basic concepts,
and their interdependencies are collected from the Wikipedia entries
of the individual concepts.
Another class of semantic NLP systems perform language gener-
ation based on the observation of events in the real world, a type of
systems which are frequently called grounded language learning. We
shall consider as example the system described by Chen, Kim and
Mooney [3].
A body of work recently reported by Chambers and Jurafsky [1],
[2] centers on the learning of narrative schemas, which they define as
coherent sequences or sets of events with participants who are defined
as semantic roles, which can be fitted by appropriate persons.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Using the concrete example of the story of Little Red Riding
Hood, this paper argued that identity is one of the crucial problems
in reasoning about narratives. We have also shown that the Xapagy
architecture, with its unusual definitions with regard to instances, verb
instances, concepts and scenes allow us to represent stories which
pose significant representational difficulties in other systems.
Normally, the page limitations of this article limited us to discuss
only snippets of the fairy tale. The full implementation of the fairy
tale in the Xapi language is available for download from the website
removed for anonymous review.
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